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CONFLICT ON THE RIGHT

What exploded in Macedonia last week like a real media bomb, but also a political one, was a letter sent by Dragan Bogdanovski, the honorary president of VMRO-DPMNE, to NOVA MAKEDONIJA; the letter was published in two instalments under the titles "Is VMRO-DPMNE Sailing Into Bulgarian Waters?" and "Why I Parted Ways With Ljupco Georgievski." In this letter, Bogdanovski, after having visited the Macedonian diaspora in the United States and Canada along with Georgievski, announced his final political and party break-up with the actual president of the "most Macedonian" party. In short, Bogdanovski is accusing Georgievski of Bulgarophilism, and of close ties with certain pronounced pro-Bulgarian "elements," whose activity has been clearly inspired and financed by anti--Macedonian Bulgarian policy and its secret police services.

Trip to America
Specifically, Bogdanovski claims that Georgievski, throughout the entire time of his visit to America and Canada, was voluntarily "in the hands" of the pro--Bulgarian and Vrhovist MPO [Macedonian Patriotic Organization], whose only goal is to prove that Macedonians are Bulgarians; an organization whose strength, "rejected by the Macedonian emigres, depends solely upon the support that it receives from Sofia" [a "Vrhovist" is someone who supports the ideology of the Vrhovni Makedonski Komitet (Supreme Macedonian Committee), a group that supported the annexation of Macedonia by Bulgaria at the end of the 19th century as a means of liberating it). Bogdanovski writes, "Although Ljupco Georgievski was officially invited by the VMRO-DPMNE Section in Toronto, which also paid for the plane tickets for him and his wife, when he arrived in Toronto, he fled from the members of his party, and, in the company of the Bulgarophile Stojco Naumov, got into the car of Ljuben Hristov from Detroit, a well-known member of the MPO and the president of the St. Paul Bulgarian-Macedonian Church in Detroit, and left for the United States. From 1-11 November, when he returned to Toronto, Ljupco Georgievski was exclusively the guest of the pro-Bulgarian Vrhovist organization, which paid all the expenses for him and his wife, as well as the expensive costs of organizing dinners and cocktail receptions for representatives of American political life and the news media. All of the meeting that Georgievski had with American elements were organized by the Bulgarian lobby in the United States. Even his English interpreter was from the MPO. Georgievski also delivered an inspired speech at a meeting of the MPO Central Committee. He did not have time to visit members of his own main party.

Admittedly, rumours about this activity by Georgievski across the border reached Macedonia even before the letter sent by Bogdanovski. It was even said that Georgievski, because of the "statesman-like activities" described above, had been physically attacked by Macedonians there. About 10 days ago, NOVA MAKEDONIJA also published a letter from a Macedonian organization in Toronto, which similarly described the overseas visit by the president of VRMO-DPMNE. Recently a video cassette has also been circulating around Sofia with pictures of public meetings there at which Georgievski was among Macedonians and at; which an explosive atmosphere prevailed, bordering upon an incident, precisely because of Georgievski's unconvincing attempt to explain the reasons for his Bulgarophile behaviour. Nevertheless, even in spite of this, the political dis-avowal that Bogdanovski arranged for him has a special "specific" political significance.

Enemy Number Three
Although VMRO-DPMNE was founded under circumstances that are still completely unclear-as befits a revolutionary organization, after all-it is certain that Dragan Bogdanovski was its principal inspirer and founder, in March 1990 in Sweden. After several conspiratorial meetings at various locations in Munich, Berlin, Skopje, and who knows where else in Europe and the world, VRMO-DPMNE was also established in Macedonia in June 1990. The very figure of Bogdanovski and his political activity are extremely controversial, but it is assumed that as a political emigre, he worked for three or four counter-intelligence services around Europe and the world (extensive polemics have been conducted in Macedonian newspapers over this), and that, allegedly, at one time he was number three on the list of Yugoslav state enemies-after Milovan Djilas and Vlado Dapcevic. It is known that the KOS [counter-intelligence service] kidnapped him from Paris, and that he spent about 10 years in Skopje prisons because of his political activity and his VMRO ideas. After this, since he-again, allegedly-"admitted everything," he was released, and left Yugoslavia with a passport in his hands. Naturally, there are assumptions that the KOS first recruited him, through its proven methods. What-ever happened, Bogdanovski continued his VMRO activity among Macedonian emigres throughout the world, with contradictory facts about destructive com-promising activities-and finally, healthy and whole, saw the day when a real VMRO party would be legally founded in Macedonia. A political emigre's dream had been fulfilled. Naturally, upon his return to his home-land he was received in triumph, as a victim of the Communist regime because of the Macedonian national cause to which he was devoted. Nevertheless, precisely because of his controversial personal political "career," and probably in order to avoid discrediting the VMRO party initiative in Macedonia from the very beginning, he only "reached" the post of the honorary president of VMRO-DPMNE.

Election of the President
Before that, however, he succeeded in having Ljupco Georgievski "installed" as the president of that party, after certain disagreements with people aspiring to that same position in the party's Skopje headquarters itself. To some extent, this was for understandable reasons: Georgievski was young, intelligent, educated, and an eloquent speaker with leadership ambitions, and perhaps the most important thing-without the compromising "blots" in his career that have always been associated with the idea of the VMRO during its lengthy history of all sorts of factions and complicated (govern-mental and paragovernmental) infiltrations. Naturally, it was assumed that because of his political inexperience, Ljupco Georgievski would be easily subject to control and guidance from his elder "fellow soldiers," headed by Bogdanovski. It turned out after this definitive party political split-that the "youth" had learned the political trade faster than Bogdanovski had hoped.

Speculations, and later even assertions, that the present VMRO-DPMNE was in "contact" with an ideological centre in Sofia spread in Macedonia soon after the elections. Frequent symptoms of such activity by this party-to which the Macedonian political scene is extremely sensitive-could be noted on the basis of an analysis of statements, interviews, political moves, and a certain general ideological concept on the part of several people in the party's leadership, as well as Georgievski himself personally. The VMRO leadership and Georgievski justified this by the need to change the attitude of "nervous" Macedonian policy with respect to Bulgaria and its policy, so that Macedonia could finally start to conduct "constructive" inter-governmental relations with its southern neighbour. Attempts were made in vain to point out to the VMRO leadership that Bulgaria, in this respect, had not retreated one iota from its well-known position of not recognizing the Macedonian nation. Georgievski and his sympathizers usually characterized these attempts as a "communist conspiracy" against VMRO-DPMNE, "anti-Macedonianism," "Yugoslavism," "Serbophilism," and so forth. More courageous analysts, however, even claimed that the ultimate goal of VMRO's political platform was to have Macedonia secede from Yugoslavia, but not establish itself as a state in doing so, so that it would be easier prey for Bulgarian territorial and national aspirations, in which case certain parts of Macedonia would even be ceded to Albania and Serbia. Such intentions could be recognized in Georgievski's arguments against the referendum in Macedonia, in the obstruction of the process of adopting the new Macedonian constitution (it was precisely this period, which was extremely important politically, that Georgievski himself chose for his above -mentioned "tour" through Canada and the United States and several of the party's top leaders, as deputies, even voted against the adoption of the constitution), and in attempts to destroy Macedonia's state leadership, headed by Gligorov (with characterizations of "anti-Macedonian activity," etc.). Finally, even on the occasion of his recent explanation of his resignation before the parliament (on 5 December), in the position of vice-president of the president of the Republic, Georgievski in a speech lasting for an hour and a half, did not miss the opportunity to describe virtually everything that the Macedonian state had undertaken in domestic and foreign policy in the darkest possible tones, with numerous serious accusations against Kiro Gligorov.

General Party Overhaul
It is precisely for this reason that Bogdanovski's current accusations against his former protégé and close colleague have enormous political significance. Bogdanovski himself admits that "because of VMRO-DPMNE's explicitly anti-Yugoslav nature, from the very day of its founding it became a refuge for Bulgarophile elements, especially former political prisoners, who were convicted at one time as adherents of Vanco Mihajlov's Vrhovist VMRO." "I was aware of this," Bogdanovski continues, "but since the main battle in the Republic had to be conducted against the Yugoslav states, I felt that even Bulgarophile fanatics would be useful for the destruction of Yugoslavia.... I thought that the pro--Bulgarian Vrhovists could be used in the struggle against the pro-Serbian Vrhovists- Vanco Mihailov's supporters against Lazar Kolishevski's." But obviously things went too far with Bulgarophilism in VMRO-DPMNE, even in Bogdanovski's opinion.'

Naturally, one must always be cautious about Bogdanovski-the political autonomy of his political activity cannot be predicted. One can expect that in the next few days VMRO-DPMNE will also spread some sort of speculations about those who have inspired this political "salto mortale" of his. The division within the VMRO leadership itself, however, as well as among its membership and sympathizers, is obvious. There are more and more sincere VMRO members, following the original principles of the VMRO ideology, especially among the republic deputies, who are not willing to continue blindly trusting their charismatic leader.

In the next few days, many questions will also be raised at the scheduled meeting of the party's Central Committee (on 7 December), and it will not be a complete surprise if it soon proves absolutely necessary for VMRO to convene a party congress in order to clarify things (and to clarify control of the party). It appears that a general party overhaul is unavoidable.